[OpenISO] Disagreement resolution process (was Re: Core G..)

[Lachlan Patrick]

Norbert Bollow wrote:
> The only respect in which the proposed DCS process is "closed"
> is that it is not an "everyone is welcome to join and participate
> with equal rights" process.

So, you're proposing a two stage process:
1. large group of people decides
2. if that fails to reach agreement, a small committee/company decides

Is that correct?

My concern is that the small group is _more_ susceptible to bias because
it's a smaller group. Of course, I'm not factoring into this the
trustworthiness of that smaller group, I'm just talking about the fact
that it's smaller. That group can be as transparent as it wants, but it
can still push through standards that no-one outside that group wants.

>  Rather it is designed to be a process
> with clear accountability.

Accountability to me implies some way to not only see what the small
group decides and how, but also a way for the masses to change that
group if it's doing the wrong thing.

E.g. in Australia we have two lawmaking groups, a House of
Representatives, and a Senate which must ratify or reject bills that the
house creates, but if the Senate rejects the same bill three times, that
can trigger a general election of both the House and the Senate. So,
checks and balances are needed to stop a small group misusing its powers.

So I guess I'm asking, what limiting methods do you imagine to control
this small "DCS" group? Is firing them the only recourse?

> I believe that the proposed organizational set-up with an appeals
> path that leads to the disagreement being dealt with in a legally
> separate organisational entity allows to maximize accountability
> for the integrity of the disagreement-resolution process, because
> it provides an effective remedy that can be taken in the (because
> of these rules, hopefully unlikely) case that the disagreement
> resolution process ever becomes corrupted.

But how to stop the DCS group from becoming corrupted?

When I say "pass the buck" I mean it could be just adding another layer,
without solving the fundamental problem that caused the first layer to
be untrustworthy. I just don't see how the DCS component of this process
can be guaranteed to be trustworthy.

> (My first idea for organizing the disagreement-resolution process
> was that it would be handled by employees of the OpenISO.org
> Foundation.  The problem with that idea is that if these employees
> collectively develop bad habits there'd not be much that one could
> do about that besides a fork creating the "hopefully truly open
> and transparent and non-corrupt international standards organization"
> or whatever one would call it.  By contrast, with the proposed set-up
> with two separate legal entities and a contract between them, it
> would be quite feasible to force the foundation to act according to
> rules in its bylaws which say that the foundation must terminate that
> contract in the case that the DCS company doesn't handle things like
> it should.)

OK, so you're saying the public component can fire the DCS component.
That is at least one balancing factor. Couldn't that be abused too,
however? If, as you say, there public component is stacked by a company
with vested interests, wouldn't they try to get an antagonistic DCS fired?

>>>> The start-up plan for all this is that initially, the founder of
>>>> OpenISO.org takes care of the DCS function until the time
>>>> requirements for this function become too great for that und
>>>> OpenISO.org manages to acquire sufficient financial resources for
>>>> being able to outsource this function.  At that stage the founder
>>>> of OpenISO.org may name the company that becomes the initial DCS
>>>> company.  In particular, at that time the OpenISO.org founder will
>>>> have the right to name a privately-held company of his own for this
>>>> function.
>>> A good start.
>> I disagree. Even if contractually obliged to be open, the recourse to a
>> third party muddies the waters considerably. This is a deal breaker
>> for me.
> 
> Are you able to suggest fact-oriented dispute-oriented rules in an
> open "everyone is welcome to join and participate with equal rights"
> environment which are robust against the "Microsoft tells its 'gold
> certified' partners to join" attack, and which are reliable without
> requiring recourse to a third party of some kind for at least some
> kinds of situations?

I agree that stacking/buying votes was the main problem with M$-OOXML.

I agree with the idea of two parties (like the House and the Senate in
the democratic example), but I just want more clarity on the powers and
limits and ways to revoke the relationship.

>>>> ### Pseudonymous Participation ###
>>>>
>>>> Pseudonymous participation in Working-Groups is allowed.  While
>>>> Working-Group participants must inform OpenISO.org of their real name,
>>>> address and employer (if any),
>>> Even if the participation has nothing to do with the employer?
>> Anonymity implies you'll get trolls and paid comments lurking in the
>> mess, but that's OK if the system doesn't allow such people to vote.
>> Comments should be able to be freely expressed.
> 
> Yes - what I'm proposing is to build a fact-oriented decision making
> system which does not in any way take recourse to decision-making by
> means of majority votes of any kind.

I agree that's a good goal, if it can be done. I agree that voting can
be stacked. But I also think smaller groups are more easily susceptible
to that kind of stacking, and hence my concerns about having a small DCS
group being used as an eventual decider.

I have another concern about this wording:
> At that stage the founder
> of OpenISO.org may name the company that becomes the initial DCS
> company.  In particular, at that time the OpenISO.org founder will
> have the right to name a privately-held company of his own for this
> function.

This implies to me that the DCS company is _not_ independent, contrary
to what you said here:
> Ultimately OpenISO.org intends to outsource the dispute resolution
> process to a legally independent "Decision Consulting Services" (DCS)
> business.

How can the founder of OpenISO.org also own the privately-held DCS
company and _not_ be legally linked? I don't understand.

Loki (I don't speak for my employer)